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INTRODUCTION
Anti-bribery enforcement continues to intensify on a global scale. More
than ever before, multinational corporations currently face high financial and
reputational risks relating to bribery and other corrupt practices. These increas-
ing risks result predominantly from an escalating enforcement of the U.S. For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). This escalation is clearly demonstrated by
an increase in the ticket price of FCPA actions in recent years: in 2014, for in-
stance, companies paid on average more than $150 million to resolve FCPA cas-
es. This value is about seven-and-a-half times higher than the average total val-
ue of monetary resolutions of corporate FCPA cases in 2012 and almost double
the same value in 2013.1 Additionally, FCPA enforcement has extended beyond
corporate America. U.S. authorities increasingly act against foreign bribery in
distant jurisdictions, even when links with the United States are remote.' To
date, eight of the top ten monetary FCPA enforcement resolutions have been
reached with non-US companies, with Siemens (Germany, $8oo million in
20o8) and Alstom (France, $772 million in 2014) topping the list of skyrocketing
monetary resolutions.
While U.S. authorities-namely, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)-still dominate the global fight
against foreign bribery, anti-bribery enforcement actions have also been gaining
priority in other jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy,
Switzerland, and the Netherlands.' From the entry into force of the Organiza-
1. See 2014 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www
.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/2014-Year-End-FCPA-Update.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6684-BXE5].
2. The FCPA has extraterritorial jurisdiction and may apply to bribery paid by a non-
U.S. company outside the United States when sufficient other links with the Unit-
ed States exist. See infra Section I.A.
3. See OECD Foreign Bribery Report: An Analysis of the Crime of Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (2014) [hereinafter OECD
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tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery Con-
vention (February 15, 1999)4 until June 2014, OECD Convention signatories
took more than 40o enforcement actions against corporations and individuals
for foreign bribery offenses.' In 2013 alone, the total amount imposed in com-
bined monetary sanctions was more than $1.2 billion, compared to $o.65 mil-
lion only a decade earlier.6
While following a hard line with FCPA offenders, U.S. enforcement author-
ities have long sought to encourage corporations to play an active role in the
fight against bribery and corruption by presenting benefits for this type of co-
operation. Specifically, corporations that voluntarily self-report incidents of
bribery to the authorities and that cooperate with the investigation have been
offered cooperation credit: for instance, in the form of an opportunity to enter
into agreed-upon resolutions rather than going through a complete and painful
criminal trial.7 This cooperation credit has been significant in shaping corporate
decisions-particularly those of large multinational companies-on how to
deal with incidents of employee involvement in foreign bribery detected by the
corporation. Seeking to prevent the adverse publicity, high costs, and business
upheaval often involved in long-running criminal proceedings, corporations in
most FCPA enforcement cases in recent years have chosen to cooperate, at least
to a certain extent, with the DOJ investigation and thereby benefit from the co-
operation credit.'
Report], http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/governance/
oecd-foreign-bribery-report_9789264226616-en [http://perma.cc/ 4 TZC-RWWS].
4. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (NOV. 21, 1997),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBriberyENG.pdf [http://
perma.cc/P8BL-KW4F].
5. See OECD Report, supra note 3, at 13.
6. Id. at 20.
7. See infra Section I.B.
8. Most FCPA settlements reached by the DOJ in recent years specifically mention
corporate cooperation with the DOJ's investigation. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Louis Berger International Resolves Foreign Bribery Charges (July
17, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/louis-berger-international-resolves-
foreign-bribery-charges [http://perma.cc/PW6J-CBQ3] ("Among other factors, in
entering into a DPA in this case, the government considered: (1) LBI's self-
reporting of the misconduct; (2) the company's cooperation, including voluntarily
making both U.S. and foreign employees available for interviews, and collecting,
analyzing and organizing evidence and information for federal investiga-
tors...."). In a very limited number of cases the DOJ mentioned the company's
refusal to cooperate with the investigation. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, PTC Inc. Subsidiaries Agree To Pay More than $14 Million To Resolve
Foreign Bribery Charges (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ptc-inc-
subsidiaries-agree-pay-more-14-million-resolve-foreign-bribery-charges [http://
perma.ccN53V-HFYR]; see also Gary DiBianco et al., U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practic-
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On September 9, 2015, however, the DOJ changed the rules of the game.
Through a memorandum titled Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrong-
doing, signed by U.S. Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates (Yates
Memo), the DOJ imposed a condition requiring companies to turn in any em-
ployees involved in corporate fraud.9 On the basis of the Yates Memo, coopera-
tion credit can no longer be awarded unless corporations identify individuals
involved in the misconduct, and provide the DOJ with all relevant facts, regard-
less of the employees' position, status, and seniority.
Holding individuals accountable for wrongdoing committed within the
scope of their employment has long been a priority for the DOJ in FCPA en-
forcement matters. This way, the DOJ seeks to encourage corporations to en-
hance their corporate culture, while securing public confidence in the U.S. jus-
tice system. In spite of this high priority, enforcement actions against individual
offenders are not always feasible. Such actions involve a special set of challenges,
particularly in disentangling who did what within a complex corporate struc-
ture. Therefore, the Yates Memo increases the burden of corporations seeking
to benefit from cooperation credit by requiring them to assist the DOJ in cop-
ing with the challenges hindering enforcement actions against individual play-
ers.
The Yates Memo continues a steady trend of strengthening the enforce-
ment approach against individuals involved in corporate fraud, including brib-
ery. Accordingly, several commentators have downplayed the innovative nature
of the Memo in the context of criminal cases, treating it as an official statement
of a long-established U.S. enforcement policy."o However, as reiterated recently
by Ms. Yates, while the requirement to provide all facts about individuals is in-
es Act Enforcement Developments and Trends and Selected Non-U.S. Anti-
Corruption Developments, 21 WORLD SEC. L. REP. 1, 2 (2015), http://www.skadden
.com/sites/default/files/publications/Skadden%2o-%2oFCPA%2oarticle.pdf
[http://perma.cc/TYU8-D4JF] ("The majority of companies choose to cooperate
with authorities. For example, eight of the io corporate settlements in 2014 and the
only two settlements announced to date in 2015 involved reportedly prompt and
genuine cooperation by the target entities.").
9. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att'y Gen., Individual Accounta-
bility for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Yates Memo],
http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download [http://perma.cc/PD2L -AVX9].
10. See, e.g., Daniel P. Chung, Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 21, 2015), http://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/09/21/individual-accountability-for-corporate-
wrongdoing/ [http://perma.cc/2STF-EWMA]; Memorandum from Covington &
Burling, LLP, DOJ Issues New Guidance on Pursuing Individual Accountability
for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.cov.com/-/media/
files/corporate/publications/2015/o/dojmemo-individual corporate-wrongdoin
g.pdf [http://perma.cc/UX32-P4RX]; Unpacking the Yates Memo: What the "New"
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deed not new, what has changed is the consequence of not doing so." The
Memo follows an "all-or-nothing" approach, requiring corporations to provide
all the facts about individual conduct in order to qualify for any cooperation
credit. Following the promulgation of the Memo, corporations are faced with a
choice: either cough up executives as a precondition for cooperation credit or roll
the dice and defend their case before a jury." This key shift in policy lies at the
heart of this Article.
Following a law and economics approach, this Article critically examines
the desirability of the policy promulgated by the Yates Memo from a social wel-
fare maximization point of view. The analysis reveals potentially serious short-
comings that may have an adverse effect on the incentives of corporations and
employees. These drawbacks stem from the conflict of interest that the Yates
Memo promotes between corporations and their employees, and from the pos-
sible chilling effect on the cooperative enforcement model the DOJ has consist-
ently fostered since 199os. Given these two pitfalls, the analysis suggests that the
new policy communicated by the Yates Memo threatens to undermine rather
than to promote the key purpose of U.S. anti-bribery enforcement policy. Ac-
cordingly, the analysis casts serious doubts on the social desirability of the
Memo's shift in policy and recommends its prompt reconsideration.
This Article is structured as follows: Part I provides a brief overview of key
FCPA enforcement trends relating to both corporate and individual wrongdo-
ers, after which Part II explores in more detail the six-step approach promulgat-
ed by the Yates Memo. Subsequently, Part III discusses the objectives of anti-
bribery enforcement and the underlying functions of corporate and individual
liability from a welfare maximization perspective. Part IV then evaluates the ex-
pected impact of the new enforcement policy on social welfare.
11. See Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att'y Gen., Remarks at the New York City Bar
Association White Collar Crime Conference (May 10, 2016), http://www.justice
.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-q-yates-delivers- r marks-new-
york-city-bar-association [http://perma.cc/KES3-R3S4].
12. The terms "coughing up high-level executives" and "rolling the dice" were specifi-
cally used by Deputy Attorney General Yates in announcing the Yates Memo at
New York University School of Law. See Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att'y Gen.,
Remarks at New York University School of Law Announcing New Policy on Indi-
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I. FCPA ENFORCEMENT
A. Background
The FCPA was enacted in 1977 following the Watergate scandal. This pio-
neering piece of legislation was the first law in the world that governed domestic
business behavior involving foreign government officials in foreign markets.4
Its main goal was to terminate a long-standing corporate culture based on the
corrupt payments of hundreds of millions of dollars to foreign officials to se-
cure business overseas.15 According to Congress, such practices had impaired
public confidence in the financial integrity of U.S. companies, and hampered
the efficient functioning of the markets.6
The FCPA contains both anti-bribery and accounting provisions. The anti-
bribery provision prohibits the corrupt offering or provision of anything of val-
ue, including payments, gifts, and other benefits, to officials of foreign govern-
ments, foreign political parties, or public international organizations, with the
intent of obtaining or retaining business. This provision applies to "issuers,"
"domestic concerns," and "agents" acting on behalf of issuers or domestic con-
cerns, as well as to "any person" who violates the FCPA while in the territory of
the United States." The accounting provisions require issuers and their agents to
create and keep accurate books and records and to devise and maintain an ade-
13. See Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure Acts
of 1977: Hearing on S. 305 Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Af-
fairs, 95th Cong. (1977); AARON G. MURPHY, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: A
PRACTICAL RESOURCE FOR MANAGERS AND EXECUTIVES (2011); Eugene R. Erbstoes-
ser et al., The FCPA and Analogous Foreign Anti-Bribery Laws-Overview, Recent
Developments, and Acquisition Due Diligence, 2 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 381 (2007); Mike
Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929 (2012);
Wallace Timmeny, An Overview of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 235
(1982).
14. Erbstoesser et al., supra note 13, at 395.
15. See HARLEY 0. STAGGERS, UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977, H.R. REP.
No. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977); S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., & URBAN AFFAIRS,
DOMESTIC & FOREIGN INVESTMENT IMPROVED DISCLOSURE ACTS OF 1977, S. REP. No.
95-114, at 3-4 (1977).
16. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3-4.
17. The term "issuer" covers any business entity that is registered under i U.S.C.
§ 781 or that is required to file reports under 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d). The term "domes-
tic concern" includes any U.S. citizen, national, or resident, as well as any business
entity that is organized under the laws of a U.S. state or that has its principal place
of business in the United States. See A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, CRIM. DIV. U.S. DEP'T JUST. & ENFORCEMENT DIV., U.S. SEC. &
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quate system of internal accounting controls. Furthermore, these provisions
prohibit individuals and businesses from knowingly falsifying books and rec-
ords or from consciously circumventing or failing to implement a system of in-
ternal controls.'8
FCPA enforcement is led by the DOJ and the SEC. The DOJ is entrusted
with criminal enforcement powers against public companies and their associat-
ed persons, including stockholders, directors, employees, and other third par-
ties acting on their behalf. Additionally, the DOJ is empowered to enforce the
FCPA's anti-bribery provision, both criminally and civilly, against U.S. citizens,
nationals, and residents, against U.S. businesses and associated persons, and
against certain foreign persons and corporations acting in furtherance of an
FCPA violation while in the territory of the United States.'9 The FCPA entrusts
the SEC with civil enforcement powers over public companies, including stock-
holders, directors, employees, and other third parties acting on their behalf.
In recent years, both the DOJ and the SEC have followed a hard line in en-
forcing the FCPA provisions, thus posing a tangible threat to corporate wrong-
doers.
B. Cooperation Credit
While adopting a harsh approach to corporate wrongdoers, U.S. authorities
have long sought to encourage corporations to cooperate in the battle against
bribery. This goal has led U.S. enforcement authorities to establish a coopera-
tive enforcement model, under which corporations may benefit from coopera-
tion credit when they voluntarily self-disclose wrongdoing and cooperate with
investigations."o This section discusses how the regulatory credit for coopera-
tion has been incorporated into various aspects of U.S. enforcement policy
against corporate fraud. As shown below, cooperation credit may play an im-
portant role in influencing prosecutors' decisions to bring charges against cor-
porations or to enter into settlements with corporate wrongdoers. The coopera-
tion credit could also influence judicial sentencing determinations for convicted
corporations.
1. Considerations in Prosecuting Business Organizations
Based on the cooperative enforcement model employed by U.S. enforce-
ment authorities in recent years, corporate self-reporting of corporate wrong-
doing and cooperation with investigations may earn corporations cooperation
credit, including declination of prosecution. The cooperative enforcement
18. Id. at 2.
19. Id. at 4.
20. See SHARON ODED, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: NEw APPROACHES TO REGULATORY
ENFORCEMENT 48-70 (2013) (presenting a detailed review of the transformation in
U.S. authorities' enforcement approach to corporate wrongdoing).
55
YALE LAW& POLICY REVIEW
model was developed through a series of DOJ Memos, starting as early as 1999
with the Memo issued by then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder." The
Holder Memo instructed U.S. prosecutors to consider eight factors in deter-
mining whether to bring charges against corporations for corporate wrongdo-
ing. Among these, the Memo specifically instructed prosecutors to consider
"[tihe corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its will-
ingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents.. . ."" The Holder Memo
further stipulated:
In determining whether to charge a corporation, that corporation's
timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to coop-
erate with the government's investigation may be relevant factors. In
gauging the extent of the corporation's cooperation, the prosecutor
may consider the corporation's willingness to identify the culprits within
the corporation, including senior executives, to make witnesses availa-
ble. ... 2 3
Importantly, the Holder Memo referred to the challenges involved in pur-
suing individual actors for corporate wrongdoing as a justification for securing
corporate cooperation:
In investigating wrongdoing by or within a corporation, a prosecutor is
likely to encounter several obstacles resulting from the nature of the
corporation itself. It will often be difficult to determine which individual
took which action on behalf of the corporation. Lines of authority and re-
sponsibility may be shared among operating divisions or departments,
and records and personnel may be spread throughout the United States
or even among several countries. Where the criminal conduct contin-
ued over an extended period of time, the culpable or knowledgeable
personnel may have been promoted, transferred, or fired, or they may
have quit or retired. Accordingly, a corporation's cooperation may be crit-
ical in identifying the culprits and locating relevant evidence.4
This approach, which rewards corporations for self-reporting and cooper-
ating with investigations, was reinforced by the Thompson Memo of 2003,25 the
21. Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Eric Holder, Bringing Criminal Charges
Against Corporations (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memo], http://www
.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2olo/o4/n1/charging-corps.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8B7C-BRJH].
22. Id. § II.
23. Id. § VI (emphasis added).
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Larry D. Thompson, Principles of Federal
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McNulty Memo of 20o6,26 and the Filip Memo of 20o8.7 In a nod to this ap-
proach, the DOJ has specifically referred to corporate voluntary self-reporting
and cooperation as key determinants in its decisions to decline prosecution in
the FCPA matter of Morgan Stanley & Co. and, more recently, in the matter of
PetroTiger.9
2. Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements
Cooperation credit has also played an important role in U.S. enforcement
authorities' decisions as to whether to enter into Deferred Prosecution Agree-
ments (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) as alternatives to trial.
Since the early 199os, the DOJ has gradually incorporated the practice of DPAs
and NPAs into the corporate arena.2 9 DPAs and NPAs comprise a wide variety
of agreements, under which prosecutors agree to defer (in DPAs) or to avoid
altogether (in NPAs) the prosecution of culpable corporations if these organiza-
tions abide by the terms of the agreements. Normally, these terms would in-
/privilegewaiver/2003jan2oprivwaivdojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma
.cc/HLQ2-JHTB].
26. Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Paul J. McNulty, Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty
Memo], http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2007/o7/o5/mcnulty
_memo.pdf [http://perma.cc/LQ7K-2JNR].
27. Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Mark Filip, Principles of Federal Prosecu-
tion of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 20o8) [hereinafter Filip Memo],
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/20o8/11/03/dag-memo-
o82820o8.pdf [http://perma.cc/XQS4-BE7Q].
28. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Morgan Stanley Managing Direc-
tor Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading Internal Controls Required by FCPA (Apr.
25, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-morgan-stanley-managing-
director-pleads-guilty-role-evading-internal-controls-required [http://perma.cc/
S4Z8-D7BD] ("The Department of Justice declined to bring any enforcement ac-
tion against Morgan Stanley related to Peterson's conduct. The company voluntar-
ily disclosed this matter and has cooperated throughout the department's investi-
gation."); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Chief Executive Officer of
Oil Services Company Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charge (June 15, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-chief-executive-officer-oil-services-
company-pleads-guilty-foreign-bribery-charge [http://perma.cc/4UYT-8NQZ]
("The case was brought to the attention of the department through a voluntary
disclosure by PetroTiger, which fully cooperated with the department's investiga-
tion. Based on PetroTiger's voluntary disclosure, cooperation, and remediation,
among other factors, the department declined to prosecute PetroTiger.").
29. Deferred prosecution was originally created at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury as an alternative arrangement used to rehabilitate juvenile and drug offenders.
See JAMES A. INCIARDI ET AL., DRUG CONTROL AND THE COURTS 35-53 (1996); David
A. Inniss, Development in the Law: Alternative to Incarceration, in HARV. L. REV.
1863, 1902-03 (1998).
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clude, among other things, the payment of a criminal fine or a civil penalty, an
obligation to cooperate with the authorities' investigation, and a commitment
to adopt structural reforms and to comply with certain standards of behavior."o
The key difference between DPAs and NPAs lies in whether the charges-and
the agreement-are filed with the court. In DPAs, the charges are filed with the
court; the parties then ask the court to approve the agreement. In NPAs, how-
ever, the agreement is reached between the corporation and the public prosecu-
tor without being filed with or approved by the court."
The Holder Memo planted the initial seeds for the recognition of DPAs and
NPAs as official prosecutorial instruments in the case of corporate wrongdoing.
As noted earlier, the Holder Memo explicitly recognized the challenge often
faced by the prosecution in determining which individual took which action on
behalf of the corporation. As such, the Memo referred to corporate cooperation
as critical in identifying the culprits and in locating relevant evidence, and
thereby allowed prosecutors to award corporations a unique credit in the form
of immunity or amnesty in exchange for their cooperation."
The Thompson Memo, which followed the Holder Memo in 2003, explicit-
ly acknowledged DPAs and NPAs as legitimate enforcement instruments that
prosecutors may use as a form of credit for corporate cooperation. Specifically,
the Memo allowed prosecutors to enter into DPAs and NPAs when a corpora-
tion's timely cooperation appeared to be necessary to the public interest and
when other means of obtaining the desired cooperation were unavailable or
would not be effective.33 Accordingly, DPAs and NPAs were officially added to
the toolkit of U.S. enforcement authorities, allowing them to close a case at an
initial stage and to secure forward-looking structural changes within the corpo-
ration. With the use of DPAs and NPAs, the DOJ and the SEC34 have substan-
tially reduced the time, energy, and costs invested per matter in FCPA cases,
while increasing their influence on future corporate compliance. Furthermore,
DPAs and NPAs have often allowed authorities to reach enforcement goals
while minimizing the collateral effects sometimes associated with a full trial.35
30. See Eugene Illovsky, Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements: The Brewing De-
bate, 21 CRIM. JUST. 36, 36-37 (20o6); Sharon Oded, Deferred Prosecution Agree-
ments: Prosecutorial Balance in Times of Economic Meltdown, 2 L.J. Soc. JUST. 65,
67-87 (2011); Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the "New Regulators": Cur-
rent Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. L. REV. 159, 160-61 (2008).
31. See Oded, supra note 30, at 70 n.n.
32. Holder Memo, supra note 21, § VI ("[G]ranting a corporation immunity or am-
nesty may be considered in the course of the government's investigation.").
33. Thompson Memo, supra note 25, § VI.B.
34. Since January 2010, DPAs and NPAs have also been available as official enforce-
ment instruments for the SEC. See infra Section II.B.3.
35. See Oded, supra note 30, at 79-82; Michael Yangming Xiao, Note, Deferred/Non-
Prosecution Agreements: Effective Tools To Combat Corporate Crime, 23 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 233, 242 (2013).
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Indeed, throughout the last decade, DPAs and NPAs have become critical
instruments for both U.S. authorities and companies in resolving corporate
corruption cases. Since 2000, the DOJ and the SEC have entered into more than
42o DPAs and NPAs, of which more than seventy-five were related to the
FCPA. 6 Both the DOJ and the SEC continuously emphasize the heightened co-
operation required for organizations to secure NPAs or DPAs.
From a corporate perspective, cooperation credit in the form of DPAs and
NPAs offers significant benefits. Apart from saving the tremendous costs of a
long-running trial, such as representation and business upheaval, DPAs and
NPAs may materially reduce reputation damages. Additionally, the resolution
of matters through DPAs and NPAs, as opposed to an adversarial legal proce-
dure, allows corporations some room-albeit limited-to influence the state-
ment of facts in the agreement document. This way, corporations may limit
their exposure in follow-up civil litigation, in which plaintiffs will seek to rely
on the statement of facts to support their claims.
3. SEC Enforcement Cooperation Program
Cooperation credit has also been adopted by the SEC as an incentivizing
mechanism. Parallel to the development of U.S. criminal enforcement as de-
scribed above, in October 2001 the SEC issued a Report of Investigation and a
statement explaining its decision not to take enforcement action against a pub-
lic company it had investigated for financial statement irregularities (known as
the Seaboard Report).3 7 In this report, the SEC articulated specific criteria that it
would consider as a basis on which to grant leniency to companies under inves-
tigation. Among other relevant considerations, the SEC specifically referred to
self-disclosure and cooperation with the investigation.38
Furthermore, in January 2010, the SEC introduced a series of measures to
intensify its enforcement policy, aiming to further encourage corporations and
individuals to cooperate with SEC investigations and enforcement actions. First,
the SEC implemented DPAs, NPAs, and other cooperation agreements previ-
36. 2015 Year-End Update on Corporate Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) and De-




37. Report of Investigation and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Coop-
eration to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44969 and
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1470, 76 SEC Docket 220 (Oct.
23, 2001).
38. Id. ("[Criterion] 8.... Did the company promptly, completely and effectively dis-
close the existence of the misconduct to the public, to regulators and to self-
regulators? Did the company cooperate completely with appropriate regulatory
and law enforcement bodies?").
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ously used only by the DOJ.39 Additionally, the SEC further stipulated the guid-
ing criteria it will use to evaluate corporate cooperation in considering whether
to apply a lenient enforcement approach in specific cases. These criteria include
self-policing prior to the discovery of the misconduct as well as cooperating
with law enforcement authorities, including providing all information relevant
to the underlying violations and evidence of the corporation's remedial ef-
forts.4o
It is important to note that the DOJ's Yates Memo is not aimed at amend-
ing the SEC enforcement policy, including with respect to the cooperation cred-
it offered by the SEC Enforcement Cooperation Program. Nevertheless, as past
experience has shown, on various occasions the SEC has tended to inde-
pendently align its enforcement policy with that of the DOJ, as with the adop-
tion of DPAs and NPAs. Andrew Ceresney, the Head of Enforcement at the
SEC, announced initial steps toward beefing up the SEC enforcement policy
shortly after the promulgation of the Yates Memo.4 Therefore, the following
evaluation of the Yates Memo may soon become relevant as well to the SEC's
enforcement policy.
4. Mitigated Sentencing
Finally, cooperation credit was included in the U.S. Organization Sentenc-
ing Guidelines (Organizational Guidelines) adopted by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission in November 1991 as Chapter 8 of the Guidelines Manual.42 The
39. For a discussion of DPAs and NPAs, see supra Section II.B.2. Cooperation agree-
ments, not discussed further in this Article, are formal written agreements in
which the SEC Enforcement Division agrees to recommend to the SEC that a co-
operator receives credit for cooperating in investigations or related enforcement
actions if the cooperator provides substantial assistance, such as full and truthful
information and testimony.
40. Policy Statement Concerning Cooperation by Individuals in Its Investigations and
Related Enforcement Actions, Release No. 34-61340, 17 C.F.R. pt. 202 (Jan. 13,
2010).
41. Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Keynote
Address at ACI's 32nd FCPA Conference (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.sec
.gov/news/speech/ceresney-fcpa-keynote-n-17-15.html [http://perma.cc/Z3F6-
7NFR] (announcing a parallel amendment in the enforcement policy of the SEC,
according to which "going forward, a company must self-report misconduct in
order to be eligible for the Division to recommend a DPA or NPA to the Commis-
sion in an FCPA case"). This newly introduced condition of non- and deferred
prosecution agreements was said to be brought forward in order to incentivize
corporations to promptly report FCPA misconduct to the SEC and to further em-
phasize the benefits that come with self-reporting and cooperation.
42. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g)(1)-(3) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2015); see also Jennifer Arlen, The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 321, 343-44 (2012) (arguing that the cooperation
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Organizational Guidelines constitute a highly explicit and comprehensive policy
that serves as a roadmap for judges in setting the sentences for convicted organ-
izations, including corporations, partnerships, pension funds, trusts, and oth-
ers.43 According to the Organizational Guidelines, in sentencing corporations,
judges should set the fine within a range that is based on the seriousness of the
offense and the culpability of the organization. In determining culpability,
judges should take into account six specific factors, such as whether the corpo-
ration has self-reported the offense in a timely manner, has thoroughly cooper-
ated with the investigation, and has accepted responsibility. 44 Accordingly, self-
reporting and cooperation with the investigation may allow the corporation to
benefit from a mitigated sentence.45 It should be noted that implementation of
the cooperation credit set forth by the Organizational Guidelines has been lim-
ited in the context of FCPA enforcement, because in reality most FCPA investi-
gations have been resolved through DPAs and NPAs rather than full court tri-
als.
C. Individual Accountability
In addition to corporate liability, the FCPA includes various channels
through which individuals may be held liable. At the outset, individuals are sub-
ject to direct criminal liability when they are directly involved in bribery, aid or
credit offered by the Organizational Guidelines is too small to encourage firms to
detect, report, and help prosecute the employees' crimes).
43. For a detailed overview of the Sentencing Guidelines, see Diana E. Murphy, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of Promoting Compliance
and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697 (2002); and ODED, supra note 20, at 144-50. For a
summary of the Sentencing Guidelines, see Paula Desio, An Overview of the Organ-
izational Guidelines, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, http://www.ussc.gov/sites
/default/files/pdf/training/organizational-guidelines/ORGOVERVIEW.pdf [http://
perma.cc/28LE-SCUS].
44. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(8).
45. To date, there is limited empirical evidence on the impact of self-disclosure and
cooperation on the ultimate fine. See, e.g., Rebecca Files, SEC Enforcement: Does
Forthright Disclosure and Cooperation Really Matter?, 53 J. ACCT. & EcON. 353 para.
VI (2012); Sarah Marberg, Promises of Leniency: Whether Companies Should Self-
Disclose Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
557, 567-68 (2012); Nicole Leeper Piquero & Jason L. Davis, Extralegal Factors and
the Sentencing of Organizational Defendants: An Examination of the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 32 J. CRIM. JUST. 643, 651 (2004); Rebecca Files et al., Cooperat-
ing with Regulators: Meaningful Credit or Sword of Damocles? 20-34 (Aug. 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026282 [http://perma.ccl
2AL8-A3VL]; see also Peter R. Reilly, Incentivizing Corporate America To Eradicate
Transnational Bribery Worldwide: Federal Transparency and Voluntary Disclosure
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1683, 1709-10 (2015) (argu-
ing that the effect of self-reporting might be non-existent).
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abet bribery, or otherwise conspire to violate the FCPA.46 Moreover, as with
corporations, individuals who knowledgably or recklessly provide substantial
assistance to a violator can be held civilly liable for aiding and abetting viola-
tions of the FCPA anti-bribery provisions.47 Likewise, while the FCPA account-
ing provisions are chiefly directed at organizations, individuals can also be held
civilly liable for aiding and abetting or causing an issuer's violation of the ac-
counting provisions. 4
FCPA individual liability is by no means limited to low-level, primary-actor
employees. In fact, U.S. authorities increasingly seek to address the highest-level
executives who are responsible for the tone, culture, or weak internal controls
that may facilitate foreign bribery and other corrupt practices.49 Already in the
late 1990s, individual accountability, including for corporate executives, was set
as an important enforcement goal by the DOJ in the Holder Memo.50 Similar
statements also appeared in later memoranda issued by the DOJ5 ' and were
eventually officially included in the U.S. Attorney's Manual as the Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations.52
46. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 17, at 34.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 43.
49. See, e.g., Laura Fraedrich & Jamie A. Schafer, What Is in It for Me: How Recent De-
velopments in FCPA Enforcement Affect the Voluntary Disclosure Calculus, 8 GLOBAL
TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 257, 262-63 (2013); Michael G. McGovern & Steven S. Gold-
schmidt, Snaring 'Control Person' Executives in FCPA Liability, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 8,
2010), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202442oi8976/Snaring-Control-
Person-Executives-in-FCPA-Liability [http://perma.cc/9HML-3XPN]; Press Re-
lease, U.S. Dep't of Justice, CEO and Managing Partner of Wall Street Broker-
Dealer Charged with Massive International Bribery Scheme (Apr. 14, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ceo-and-managing-partner-wall-street-broker-
dealer-charged-massive-international-bribery [http://perma.cc/M3DF-J2WZ]
("We will aggressively pursue individual executives, all the way up the corporate
ladder, when they try to bribe their way ahead of the competition.").
5o. See Holder Memo, supra note 21, § I.B ("Charging a corporation, however, does
not mean that individual directors, officers, employees, or shareholders hould not
also be charged. Prosecution of a corporation is not a substitute for the prosecu-
tion of criminally culpable individuals within or without the corporation. Further,
imposition of individual criminal liability on such individuals provides a strong
deterrent against future corporate wrongdoing.").
51. See Thompson Memo, supra note 25, § I; McNulty Memo, supra note 26, § II.B;
Filip Memo, supra note 27, § 9-28.200.B.
52. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-28.210 (2015), http://www
.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28ooo-principles-federal-prosecution-business-
organizations [http://perma.cc/UZ8A-EXZR] ("Prosecution of a corporation is
not a substitute for the prosecution of criminally culpable individuals within or
without the corporation. Because a corporation can act only through individuals,
imposition of individual criminal liability may provide the strongest deterrent
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In practice, the enforcement focus on individuals has translated into nu-
merous actions against corporate executives and employees for their own re-
sponsibility for foreign bribery. As shown by the figure below, in the six-year
period between 2002 and 2008, the DOJ and the SEC brought FCPA charges
against 64 individuals, while in the subsequent six-year period this number




35 - .--- --
30




2002 2003 2004 2005 2oo6 2007 20o8 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Figure 1: DOJ and SEC charges against individuals: 2002-201453
In 2015, actions against individuals made up eighty percent of the DOJ's
FCPA enforcement docket. That year, the DOJ brought no action against a cor-
poration without also prosecuting officers associated with it." Furthermore, on
at least two recent occasions-the Morgan Stanley and PetroTiger cases-U.S.
authorities have taken individual enforcement action against former corpora-
against future corporate wrongdoing. Provable individual culpability should be
pursued, particularly if it relates to high-level corporate officers... regardless of
the ultimate corporate disposition, a separate evaluation must be made with re-
spect to potentially liable individuals.").
53. FCPA Digest: Recent Trends and Patterns in the Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP 2 (Jan. 2015), http://www.shearman
.com/-/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2015/ol/Recent-Trends-and-
Patterns-only-LT-oio515.pdf [http://perma.cc/WK8J-CZTA]. Note that the spike
in enforcement actions in 2009 is attributable to the so-called "SHOT Show" sting,
in which the DOJ charged twenty-two individuals from sixteen different compa-
nies as part of an alleged conspiracy. All those charges were eventually dismissed,
however, making the statistics for 2009 somewhat unrepresentative.
54. See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 36.
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tion executives, even when declining to bring actions against the corporations."
Officials from both the DOJ and the SEC have repeatedly reinforced their firm
commitment to continue pursuing individual corporate officers suspected of
foreign bribery, revealing that the authorities "look for ways to innovate in or-
der to further strengthen [their] ability to charge individuals."56 The Yates
Memo is one such innovative policy amendment.
II. YATES MEMO
Issued by the Deputy Attorney General, Sally Quillian Yates, on September
9, 2015, the Yates Memo further increases the DOJ's focus on individual ac-
countability. Under this approach, holding individual wrongdoers accountable
is necessary to achieve actual deterrence of corporate misdeeds, to have a real
impact on corporate culture, and to ensure that the public has confidence in the
justice system.57 But doing so is not free of practical challenges, particularly in
determining which individual took which action on behalf of the corporation.
The challenges involved in pursuing individual actors for corporate wrongdoing
were highlighted by the Holder Memo in 1999 and in various public speeches by
55. Garth Peterson, a former real estate executive at Morgan Stanley, was charged by
the DOJ and the SEC with violating the FCPA and securities laws in relation to his
role in a conspiracy to evade the company's internal accounting controls. See
Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Att'y Gen., Speech at American Conference Institute's
31st International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 19,
2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-
caldwell-speaks-american-conference-institute-s-31st [http://perma.cc/8M9F-
DQX3]; see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Former
Morgan Stanley Executive with FCPA Violations and Investment Adviser Fraud
(Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/
1365171488702 [http://perma.cc/9XBG-Q6WG]. Morgan Stanley was not charged in
this matter. Similarly, Joseph Sigelman, PetroTiger's former co-CEO, pleaded
guilty in June 2015 in the District Court of New Jersey to conspiracy to violate the
FCPA, while the DOJ decided to decline prosecution against PetroTiger based on
its self-reporting and cooperation.
56. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech at the NYC Bar Associa-
tion's Third Annual White Collar Crime Institute: Three Key Pressure Points in
the Current Enforcement Environment (May 19, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/
Speech/Detail/Speech/137054858285 [http://perma.cc/3FQT-5UAZ]; see also Leslie
R. Caldwell, Assistant Att'y Gen., Remarks at the Taxpayers Against Fraud Educa-
tion Fund Conference (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
remarks-assistant-attorney-general-criminal-division-leslie-r-caldwell-taxpayers-
against [http://perma.cc/S5NC-GJEH]; Marshall L. Miller, Principal Deputy Assis-
tant Att'y Gen., Remarks at the Global Investigation Review Program (Sept. 17,
2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-principal-deputy-assistant-
attorney-general-criminal-division-marshall--miller [http://perma.cc/9B5Q-
M7JK]; U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 49.
57. These goals were formulated by Deputy Attorney General Yates in her speech on
May 10, 2016. See Yates, supra note ii.
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DOJ officials.5' These challenges were more recently exemplified by the acquit-
tal of a former Warner Chilcott executive, Carl Reichel, of conspiring to bribe
doctors in order to promote the sales of the company drugs.s" The acquittal
came after Warner Chilcott and several former managers pled guilty to similar
charges.6 0 Similarly, in 2012, the DOJ dropped all charges against several former
executives of Stryker Biotech LLC, even after the company pled guilty to a mis-
demeanor misbranding charge and paid a $15 million fine.61
The challenges to holding individuals accountable for wrongdoing within
the scope of their employment led the DOJ to reconstruct the enforcement pol-
icy in a way that enlists culpable corporations to assist the DOJ in pursuing in-
dividual actors. Corporations are now required to gather all relevant infor-
mation on involved employees and share it, in its entirety, with the DOJ as a
precondition for cooperation credit. Deputy Attorney General Yates clarified
the goal of the amended policy in speeches delivered on September 10, 2015 at
the New York University School of Law and on May 10, 2016 at the New York
City Bar Association White Collar Crime Conference.62 Below is a summary of
the memo's key steps.
A. Cooperation Credit: An "All-or-Nothing" Approach
This step is the most substantial shift from the DOJ's previous practice and
relates to the way in which the DOJ now interprets the cooperation factor in as-
sessing whether to bring charges against or negotiate an agreement with culpa-
ble corporations.' On the basis of the Yates Memo, in order for companies to
receive any cooperation credit, they must fully disclose to the DOJ all relevant
facts about individuals' involvement in the misconduct, regardless of their posi-
tion, status, or seniority. In practice, cooperation credit would not be awarded
to corporations that failed to disclose all information regarding employees en-
58. See Holder Memo, supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also Yates, supra note
n1; Yates, supra note 12.
59. United States v. Reichel, No. 1:15-CR-10324 (D. Mass. June 17, 2016), ECF No. 246.
60. Jonathan Sack, Recent Trials Highlight DOj's Challenges in Prosecuting Individuals




61. Plea Agreement, United States v. Stryker Biotech, LLC, No. og-CR-1o330-GAO (D.
Mass. Jan. 17, 2012), ECF No. 290, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/plea
_agreements/pdf/StrykerBiotech.pdf [http://perma.cc/8HCE-6AXD].
62. See Yates, supra note n; Yates, supra note 12.
63. The cooperation factor-the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents-was
originally determined by the Holder Memo, and was further adopted in the fol-
lowing series of Deputy Attorney General memoranda through the Filip Memo.
See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
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gaged in the wrongdoing even if they self-reported violations and generally co-
operated with the investigation.6 4
The Yates Memo further stipulates that corporate cooperation will be close-
ly assessed by the DOJ on the basis of its timeliness, diligence, thoroughness,
proactive nature, and other related factors. The cooperation expected from cor-
porations does not end once the ink on the settlement documents has dried.
Agreed-upon resolutions such as plea agreements, DPAs, and NPAs will include
a standard provision that requires continued cooperation even after the signing
of an agreement while the government is still pursuing individual wrongdo-
ers. A company's failure to continue its cooperation with the DOJ will be con-
sidered a material breach of the agreement and will provide the DOJ with a
ground for revocation.'
Lastly, the Yates Memo also extends its applicability to civil enforcement
matters (e.g., False Claims Act matters) and stipulates that corporations under
civil investigation seeking cooperation credit must provide to the DOJ all rele-
vant facts about individual misconduct in order to receive any consideration in
the negotiation.
B. Other Steps
Next to the "all-or-nothing" approach to cooperation credit, the Yates
Memo includes supplementary steps that are geared toward strengthening indi-
vidual accountability:
Focus on individuals from the inception of the investigation. The Yates
Memo explicitly recognizes the practical challenges involved in pursuing indi-
vidual actors for corporate wrongdoing. These are particularly salient in large
multinational corporations where ownership is separated from daily control.
Interestingly, these challenges were recognized more than sixteen years ago by
the Holder Memo. At that time, they served as the basis for a lenient approach
toward corporations with the aim of encouraging cooperation.6 6 Today, the
Yates Memo handles these challenges differently. It guides all U.S. Attorneys to
focus on building cases against individual wrongdoers from the inception of an
investigation, thereby increasing their ability to gather relevant facts about these
individuals.
Enhanced internal communication. To further increase the efficiency of
the DOJ's enforcement, the Yates Memo directs U.S. civil and criminal attor-
neys to collaborate with each other-to the full extent permitted by law-at all
stages of the investigation.
No protection of individuals in corporate resolutions. This step further
emphasizes the DOJ's intention of holding individuals accountable regardless of
any resolution reached with the corporation. Accordingly, resolution agree-
ments such as DPAs and NPAs with corporations can no longer contain provi-
sions to dismiss charges against individuals or to otherwise immunize them
from liability except under extraordinary circumstances.
64. See Yates Memo, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
65. See Yates, supra note 12.
66. See Holder Memo, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
66
35:49 2016
COUGHING UP EXECUTIVES OR ROLLING THE DICE?
Resolution of individual cases. This step is aimed at ensuring that DOJ at-
torneys do not ignore actions against individuals while focusing on the investi-
gation against the corporation. Delayed action against individuals may be
blocked due to the expiration of limitation periods. Therefore, DOJ attorneys
are instructed to submit to supervisors their plans on how to resolve cases
against individuals if these have not been concluded by the time of resolution
with the corporation. Furthermore, decisions to decline prosecution of individ-
uals should be memorialized and approved by the relevant Assistant Attorney
General or a U.S. Attorney.
Pursuing individual actors. The Yates Memo stipulates that in addition to
recovering as much money as possible from wrongdoers, DOJ civil enforcement
also aims to deter future misconduct. As such, the DOJ decision whether to file
a civil action must not turn solely on whether the individual wrongdoer is
judgment-proof. According to the Memo, there is real deterrence value in
bringing civil cases against individuals who engage in corporate malpractice,
even if the individual is unable to satisfy the entire judgment due to his/her lim-
ited resources. Therefore, when the DOJ decides whether to bring suit against
individuals, it should consider those individuals' ability to pay along with other
considerations such as their misbehavior, past records, and the circumstances of
the misconduct.
III. ANTI-BRIBERY ENFORCEMENT: A LAW AND EcONOMics APPROACH
Having described the recent important developments in the anti-bribery
enforcement policy brought about by the Yates Memo, this Part outlines the
objectives of anti-bribery enforcement and the underlying functions of corpo-
rate and individual liability from a welfare maximization perspective. Initially, it
clarifies the chief goal of anti-bribery enforcement policy, which will serve in
Part IV as the basis for an evaluation of the Yates Memo from a social welfare
perspective. It continues by exploring the economic function of corporate and
individual liability. This discussion is important in order to subsequently point
to the possible impact of the Yates Memo on corporate and individual incen-
tives.
A. The Economic Goal ofAnti-Bribery Enforcement
Bribery is harmful to society in a number of ways: the impediment of eco-
nomic growth, the diversion of public resources from other important priori-
ties, and the weakening of the rule of law are only a few of the costs that bribery
imposes on society.67 This social cost is the primary economic justification for
67. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 17, at 2-3; Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Law
and Economics of Bribery and Extortion, 6 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 217, 218-21 (2010);
see also Raymond Fisman & Jakob Svensson, Are Corruption and Taxation Really
Harmful to Growth? Firm Level Evidence, 83 J. DEv. ECON. 63, 68-73 (2007); Jen-
nifer Hunt & Sonia Laszlo, Is Bribery Really Regressive? Bribery's Costs, Benefits, and
Mechanisms, 40 WORLD DEV. 355, 355 (2012); Shang-Jin Wei, How Taxing Is Cor-
ruption on International Investors?, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 4-8 (2000).
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anti-bribery enforcement. Therefore, in a hypothetical world-in which anti-
bribery enforcement is cost-free-an efficient enforcement policy would have a
single goal: minimizing the social costs of bribery and corruption.68
However, the cost of anti-bribery enforcement is steep. Corrupt practices
are normally difficult to detect, particularly when carried out in the shadow of
enforcement threats. Offenders can be sophisticated, and in many cases bribes
are camouflaged as friendly gestures, gifts, free goods, inflated payments, royal-
ties, or consulting fees. Bribes can also be channeled through third parties, such
as agents, consultants, and intermediaries. In some instances, bribery may result
from the accumulated actions of several employees, each playing a small role in
a larger scheme. These characteristics of typical bribery schemes make it partic-
ularly challenging for enforcement authorities to trace misconduct.
Furthermore, even when red flags have alerted authorities, reaching full de-
tection and evidence-based findings of an FCPA violation requires substantial
resources. In many cases-particularly when large multinational corporations
are involved-the bribery investigations require immense resources to identify
and review a large amount of physical and electronic data, such as financial ad-
ministration systems, internal records, audit reports, email accounts of various
custodians, phone records, and other sources. Review of this information is
normally supplemented by personal interviews with potentially relevant corpo-
rate employees and representatives to obtain additional details relating to sus-
pected allegations. In addition to the costs involved in the aforementioned in-
vestigatory actions, anti-bribery enforcement is also associated with indirect
costs, such as administrative costs (i.e., those of enforcement and investigation
by authorities and courts); procedural costs (i.e., of criminal trials); error costs
(i.e., of convicting an innocent person or discharging a culpable one); and eva-
sion costs (i.e., investments by wrongdoers to cover their tracks and escape lia-
bility).
In summary, enforcement actions against foreign bribery can be exceeding-
ly expensive. Hence, the efficiency of an enforcement policy cannot be meas-
ured solely by its level of effectiveness, that is, on how productive it is in pre-
venting bribery and minimizing the associated social harm. In order to assess
the efficiency of anti-bribery enforcement systems, one must also consider the
total social resources spent in putting these enforcement systems into action. To
maximize total social welfare, an anti-bribery enforcement policy should mini-
mize the sum of the social costs associated with bribery and with its prevention,
including the cost of enforcement.6 9 Accordingly, from a law and economics
perspective, the social desirability of any anti-bribery enforcement policy
should be assessed based on the policy's ability to achieve the combined goal of
minimized bribery-related social harm and enforcement costs.
68. For simplification, the analysis assumes away any social benefits that may arise
from bribery.
69. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 485-532 (6th ed. 2012);
Arun S. Malik, Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement, 21 RAND J. ECON.
341, 347 (1990); George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL.
ECON. 526, 533 (1970).
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B. The Economic Function ofAnti-Bribery Enforcement
The scholarship of law and economics relies primarily on the rational
choice theory as the basis for predicting behavior. According to this theory,
market actors determine their actions by juxtaposing the expected costs and
benefits of alternative behavioral choices and eventually opting for the behavior
that maximizes their own objectives.70 The rational choice theory has been ap-
plied in the context of crime and punishment and has led to the development of
the Deterrence Theory.71 In the context of this Article, the Deterrence Theory
suggests that individuals consider whether to engage in bribery by assessing
their expected net payoff in each possible scenario: namely, when they do and
do not engage in bribery. Table 1, below, illustrates a simplified rational deci-
sion-making process relating to a hypothetical bribery payment. Consider for
instance an individual who contemplates whether to pay a bribe of $100,000 to
a foreign government official, in which case he/she would be awarded a contract
yielding a profit of $1 million. If the individual does not pay the bribe, the con-
tract is awarded to another person. In this instance, the individual invests noth-
ing and so does not profit from the project in any way.
Cost Benefit
Bribing $1o,ooo + EL $1,000,000
Not bribing 0 0
Table 1: Rational Bribery Payment Decision
Each of the two bottom rows in Table i depicts the costs and benefits asso-
ciated with an alternative choice of behavior: engaging in bribery or avoiding
bribery. EL represents the expected liability one would face in the event of en-
gaging in bribery. This expected liability is normally a function of the probabil-
ity and the severity of sanctions levied by the government." Applying the deter-
rence theory, the individual will engage in bribery only if the net payoff in the
bribery scenario, $i,ooo,ooo - ($ioo,ooo + EL), which is $900,000 - EL, is
greater than the net payoff in the alternative scenario of not bribing: namely,
70. For a general discussion of the rational choice theory, see MICHAEL ALLINGHAM,
RATIONAL CHOICE (1999); and RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: RESISTING
COLONIZATION 16-36 (Margaret S. Archer & Jonathan Q. Tritter eds., 2001).
71. The first to formalize the deterrence hypothesis was Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968), which analyzed
offenders' behavioral choices as decisions made by rational agents weighing the
costs and benefits of their actions when deciding whether to commit a crime. See
also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforce-
ment of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45 (2000); David B. Spence, The Shadow of
the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor Models in Environmental
Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 919 (2001); Stigler, supra note 69, at 526-36.
72. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 69.
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$o. In other words, in the example above, the decision-maker is expected to en-
gage in bribery only if the expected liability is lower than $900,000, i.e., only if
EL < $9oo,ooo.73 If the expected liability is greater than $900,000, the decision-
maker is simply better off avoiding the bribery scenario.
While the above example is overly simplified, it clearly illustrates the role
and the economic function of anti-bribery enforcement where individual actors
are concerned: deterring bribery by ensuring that individuals face an expected
liability that makes them worse off if they opt to engage in bribery. This way,
the net payoff of bribery is negative, and the decision-maker is better off not
engaging in it.1 Hence, when the enforcement policy produces an adequate
threat, no benefit can be expected from engaging in bribery.71
C. The Economic Function of Corporate Liability
Corporations are fictitious entities that operate through their flesh-and-
blood employees. Hence, one might question the necessity of and justification
for holding corporations liable for bribery offenses carried out by corporate
employees. After all, if enforcement policy were adequately designed, individual
employees anticipating their expected liability would not engage in bribery.
However, an economic analysis of law suggests at least two interlinked justifica-
tions for holding corporations liable.76
73. This example is obviously a simplification of reality and does not take into account
other possible factors such as public relations and the impact on reputation that
would normally play a role in corporate decisions.
74. The Deterrence Theory, as it is normally referred to, has been accepted in the law
and economics scholarly literature as the fundamental economic theorem of crime
and punishment. See Anthony G. Heyes, Making Things Stick: Enforcement and
Compliance, 14 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'y 50, 51-54 (1998); Polinsky & Shavell, su-
pra note 71; Stigler, supra note 69.
75. The Deterrence Theory was criticized by various scholars as overly simplifying
reality. Scholars particularly referred to the bounded rationality of agents, includ-
ing corporate actors, as the main limitation of the purely economic Deterrence
Theory. For an extensive literature overview, see ODED, supra note 20, at 43-47.
76. The enhanced control exerted by corporations over employees has been discussed
in various studies. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT
LAW 173-74 (1987); Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994); Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraak-
man, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 700 (1997); Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Liability
Standards: When Should Corporations Be Held Criminally Liable?, 37 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1239, 1245 (2002); Reinier H. Kraakman, Vicarious and Corporate Civil Liabil-
ity, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 135-37 (Michael Faure ed., 2d ed. 2009); Sharon
Oded, Inducing Corporate Compliance: A Compound Corporate Liability Regime, 31
INT'L REV. L. ECON. 272 (2011); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compli-
ance Programs as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?,
47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605, 678 (1995); Kevin B. Huff, Note, The Role of Corporate
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Deterrence. The first justification is a straightforward application of the
underlying logic of individual liability in the corporate context. Corporations
direct their employees' actions, determine their roles and responsibilities, and
set their pay. At the same time, corporations are also affected by the actions of
employees within the scope of their employment. They are often the main bene-
ficiaries of such actions. Corporate liability may play an important role in en-
suring that corporations direct their employees to choose an honest course of
action rather than a corrupt one.
Consider a corporation that might win an important public tender if its
employees present an innovative, competitive proposal. This corporation could
also win the same project-possibly with higher profit margins-if its employ-
ees were to bribe the official running the tender. To ensure that this corporation
directs its employees away from the corrupt course of action, corporate liability
could produce an expected accountability that makes the corporate payoff in
the corrupt scenario unfavorable. The deterrence function of corporate liability
is therefore similar to the one explained above in Table i.
Enforcement cost reduction through corporate control. This justification is
unique to corporate liability, and goes beyond the simple application of indi-
vidual liability in the corporate context. It stems from the complex structure of
corporations compared to individual actors. Unlike individuals, corporations
are complex entities composed of various actors operating collectively on behalf
of a legal person. As discussed earlier, the corporate setting makes it costly for
enforcement authorities to determine which individual took which action on
behalf of the corporation." Some of these high enforcement costs could be pre-
vented by inducing corporations to apply their enhanced ability to control,
monitor, and investigate employees' activities.' Thus, corporate liability also
serves to motivate corporations to use their enhanced ability to control employ-
ees and thereby improve the overall efficiency of anti-bribery enforcement.
The underlying assumption of this justification of corporate liability is that
corporations can often monitor, control, and investigate their employees more
efficiently than public authorities. The basis for this assumption is the wide va-
riety of tools available for corporations to direct, manage, and control employee
behavior-tools to which enforcement authorities do not have access. For in-
stance, corporations can set an appropriate organizational tone and determine
the business values in their employees' working environment, such that corrupt
practices remain outside the boundaries of accepted business behavior. Corpo-
rations can also set internal policies and procedures that guide employees to
conduct their activities without the use of bribery and teach them how to oper-
ate while respecting the corporation's anti-corruption business principles. Fur-
thermore, corporations are able to establish a wide range of internal controls,
such as reporting and approval duties, anti-bribery audits and screenings, rota-
tion of roles, whistleblowing and speak-up mechanisms, disciplinary actions,
and many other means to ensure that their anti-bribery policies are respected.
Compliance Programs in Determining Corporate Criminal Liability: A Suggested Ap-
proach, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1252, 1281 (1996).
77. See supra text accompanying note 24.
78. See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 42.
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Hence, corporate liability may play an important role in motivating organiza-
tions to effectively use those unique capabilities. By holding companies vicari-
ously responsible for employees' wrongdoing, an enforcement policy may mo-
tivate them to exercise their control capabilities in order to reduce their own
legal exposure.
These two justifications for holding corporations vicariously liable for brib-
ery carried out by their employees are closely linked to the combined goal of en-
forcement policies discussed above in Section III.A: minimizing bribery-related
social harm and enforcement costs. Because corporations are better able than
enforcement authorities to control employees and to detect and investigate vio-
lations, corporate liability may ultimately reduce both bribery-related social
harm and the costs of enforcement.
D. Individual Accountability
As explained above, anti-bribery corporate liability is said to induce corpo-
rations to exercise control over employees, thereby preventing and responding
to corrupt actions by employees. Under these circumstances, is individual liabil-
ity still needed? Should individual employees be held liable even when their
employer bears liability?
The law and economics scholarly literature has dealt with this question and
has proposed the neutrality principle as an initial response. According to this
principle, the state can optimally deter crime through either individual or cor-
porate liability, and thus does not need to employ joint individual and corpo-
rate liability, as long as the expected liability is adequately set at the optimal lev-
el, i.e., the level of social harm.9 Furthermore, commentators have suggested
that as long as the social cost of both corporate and individual liability is simi-
lar, the state is indifferent as to which type of liability it applies.so The underly-
ing explanation of this principle is that corporations and individuals may inter-
nalize each other's liability exposure. More specifically, when only individuals
face a risk of liability, corporations internalize this risk through the salaries they
pay their employees, which must compensate employees for their expected lia-
bility associated with their work. Similarly, when only corporations face a liabil-
ity risk, they induce their employees to internalize this risk by imposing sanc-
tions on employees who commit crimes that are equal to their own liability
79. See Jennifer Arlen, Corporate.Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 144 (Keith N. Hylton & Alon
Harel eds., 2012); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between
Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345 (1982); A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Im-
prisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability?, 13 INT'L REV. L. ECON. 239
(1993); Kathleen Segerson & Tom Tietenberg, The Structure of Penalties in Envi-
ronmental Enforcement: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 179
(1992); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984).
8o. See Kornhauser, supra note 79, at 1357-72; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 79, at
239-42, 246-53; Segerson & Tietenberg, supra note 79, at 185-88; Sykes, supra note
79, at 1233-59.
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exposure. Therefore, under the assumption of the neutrality principle (i.e., op-
timal level of sanctioning), when corporations are held liable for their employ-
ees' bribery practices, there is no justification for holding the involved employ-
ees liable for the same actions as well.
Nevertheless, the principal weakness of the neutrality theory seems to be
the demanding assumption upon which it is based-that he expected liability
is indeed adequately set at the optimal level. In actuality, due to various chal-
lenges such as low detection rates, corporate wealth constraints, and a limited
enforcement budget, states are often unable to impose on corporations a social-
ly optimal expected liability that equals the social cost of the crime." Under
these circumstances, corporate liability is likely to fall short of inducing corpo-
rations to impose optimal sanctions on employees."
Additionally, there may be several further justifications for holding indi-
viduals personally accountable for bribery and corrupt practices, even when
undertaken within the scope of the employment. First and foremost, while it
may be more cost-effective for corporations to detect and investigate instances
of bribery by individual employees, they lack the ability to sanction employees
in the same manner that a government authority can. Indeed, corporations may
discipline their employees, discontinue their employment, and under certain
circumstances also apply financial consequences uch as bonus forfeiture. Nev-
ertheless, corporations possess neither the legal powers equivalent o those of
the government (civil, administrative, and criminal law) nor the incentive to
make bribery publicly known through legal proceedings.
Furthermore, even when corporations are able to take legal action against
their rogue employees, for instance, in order to recover their own losses result-
ing from the bribery, they may be discouraged from doing so, given the risk to
the corporation of legal exposure and reputational damage. Similarly, if corpo-
rate executives are involved in the illegal activity, they may influence the corpo-
rate decision such that the organization does not pursue the individuals in-
volved.8 3 From this perspective, corporate incentive schemes often deviate from
the overall social interest with which enforcement authorities are entrusted.
Moreover, in the absence of individual accountability, one may argue that
corporations may treat eventual fines as the costs of doing business and might
thereby be more inclined to take risks when the probability of detection and the
expected fine are insufficient to outweigh the anticipated gain.84 Conversely,
lack of individual accountability may increase the agency cost between corpora-
81. See Arlen, supra note 79.
82. See, e.g., Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 857 (1984).
83. See Arlen, supra note 79, at 171 (referring to the agency costs between corporate
managers and shareholders as a potential element preventing corporations from
pursuing their employees for their involvement in misconduct).
84. See Yates, supra note 12 ("[B]y holding individuals accountable, we can change
corporate culture to appropriately recognize the full costs of wrongdoing, rather
than treating liability as a cost of doing business-a change that will protect public
resources over the long term.").
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tions and their employees and encourage employees to engage in bribery to
achieve their business targets and personal benefits while knowing that the cor-
poration alone bears the risk of liability. Lastly, the imposition of individual lia-
bility, even when the bribery is undertaken within the scope of the employment,
serves to strengthen the credible commitment of employees and managers to
avoid bribery. Hence, individual accountability cannot be relinquished simply
due to the existence of corporate liability.
E. The Economic Function of Regulatory Credit
Corporate control over employees in preventing, detecting, and investigat-
ing bribery is costly, and this cost increases as the size of the company increases.
Therefore, while corporate liability as well as reputational concerns often moti-
vate corporations to exercise control, their own expected liability might increase
with regard to self-reporting and cooperation. Corporate expected liability is a
function of the probability and the severity of sanctions being levied by the gov-
ernment.5 When corporations self-report wrongdoing, the probability of detec-
tion increases (one hundred percent probability), and so does the expected lia-
bility. Therefore, in the absence of other sources of motivation (e.g., a reduction
of the severity of the fine due to self-reporting), one should not expect rational
corporations to voluntarily self-report bribery and to cooperate with public in-
vestigations."6
Corporate self-reporting and cooperation can be crucial to the success of an
investigation. Without this cooperation, the likelihood of detection is limited,
and so are the odds of securing sufficient evidence to reach a conviction. There-
fore, U.S. enforcement policy has used cooperation credit as a motivation tool
to induce corporate self-reporting and cooperation, thereby reducing corporate
liability exposure (for example, by decreasing the odds that U.S. authorities will
bring charges against the corporation). This credit may also allow cooperative
corporations to enter into a settlement agreement such as a DPA or NPA rather
than going through a full trial. In this way, cooperation credit places coopera-
tive corporations in a more advantageous position compared to those that do
not work together with authorities. Accordingly, this credit may motivate cor-
porations to self-report bribery and to cooperate with the public investigation."
85. Cf. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 69, at 488; supra text accompanying note 72.
86. The underlying logic of corporations' self-reporting decision-making resembles
the example provided supra in Section III.B with respect to the rational choice
theory. Corporations juxtapose the expected costs and benefits of alternative be-
havioral choices and eventually opt for the behavior that maximizes their own ob-
jectives. Only when the net expected benefits of self-reporting outweigh the net
expected costs of self-reporting would corporations self-report. See Oded, supra
note 76, at 273.
87. Various law and economics commentators-including the author of this Article-
have thoroughly explored the socially desirable structure of corporate liability and
cooperation credits. See generally Arlen, supra note 76; Arlen, supra note 79; Arlen
& Kraakman, supra note 76; Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the
Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003); Kimberly D.
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IV. YATES MEMO: EVALUATION
Following the description of the law and economics analytical framework
in Part III, I turn now to evaluating the newly emerged enforcement policy
promulgated by the Yates Memo. At the outset, individual liability for bribery
conducted within the scope of employment is justifiable from a social welfare
maximization point of view. Criminal and civil actions against corporate indi-
viduals have the potential to influence corporations and their employees in a
way that enforcement actions against corporations alone may not always
achieve. The increased focus of U.S. authorities on individual accountability
therefore coincides with the objectives of increasing deterrence and bringing
effective change in corporate conduct. The question remains, however, whether
the new policy as announced in the Yates Memo can also be supported from the
social welfare maximization perspective.
Should turning in culpable employees be a condition of granting corpora-
tions cooperation credit from a social welfare maximization point of view? To
answer this question, recall the combined aim of anti-bribery enforcement poli-
cy: the policy announced in the Yates Memo is socially desirable if the resulting
social benefits-minimizing the cost of bribery and its prevention-outweigh
its negative ramifications. In the following, I explore certain possible influences
that the Yates Memo could have on individual and corporate incentives. The
analysis is based on the rational choice theory framework presented in Section
III.B, according to which corporations and individuals consider their course of
action-e.g., whether to engage in bribery, self-report, or cooperate with the
investigation-by assessing their expected net payoff in each possible scenario.
Each actor will choose the course of action that yields the greatest net payoff.
The Yates Memo may have serious ramifications for this decision-making pro-
cess. The ramifications stem from (i) the conflict of interest promoted by the
Yates Memo between corporations and their employees, and (ii) the chilling ef-
fect that this policy has on the cooperative enforcement model the DOJ has
promoted since the 1990s. As such, the policy promulgated by the Yates Memo
threatens to undermine the key purpose of U.S. anti-bribery enforcement poli-
cy. Both ramifications are discussed below.
A. Conflict of Interest
The Yates Memo is focused on increasing individual accountability. To
achieve this, the Memo goes beyond influencing individual incentives. In fact,
the Memo restructures corporate incentives in a way that seeks to encourage
companies to turn in their own employees in order to benefit from cooperation
Krawiec, Organization Misconduct: Beyond the Principal Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 571 (2005); Oded, supra note 76. Scholarly literature in the field reveals that
the circumstances under which cooperation credit is awarded, including condi-
tions and the size of the award, are of considerable importance. Inadequate coop-
eration credit may lead to over- or under-deterrence and thereby sub-optimally af-
fect the social cost of bribery and of its prevention. However, the scholarly debate
over the apparently unresolved issue of the optimal structure of corporate liability
and cooperation credit is outside the scope of this Article.
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credit. In this manner, the Memo aims to increase liability exposure for indi-
vidual employees and thereby to strengthen the deterrence effect of the en-
forcement policy. While seeking to increase deterrence in terms of individual
actors, however, the Memo creates a conflict of interest between corporations
and their employees which may be counterproductive to the goal of the Memo.
Like the preceding DOJ enforcement policy (the Filip Memo), the Yates
Memo relies on the superior ability of corporations to control, monitor, and
investigate employee conduct compared to the lesser ability of enforcement au-
thorities."8 The Memo attempts to leverage this ability of corporations to fur-
ther increase the deterrent effect of the U.S. enforcement policy. However, the
Yates Memo interrupts the tangible balance of interests between corporations
and their employees which existed under earlier enforcement policies. In the
pre-Memo world, when self-reporting and cooperation with investigations were
focused on sharing information about the wrongdoing, rather than the wrongdo-
ers, corporations and their employees were motivated to cooperate with the in-
vestigation to the extent that by doing so they could sufficiently mitigate the
overall liability exposure related to the wrongdoing.9 The Memo interferes with
this balance, as corporations are now required to share incriminating infor-
mation regarding their involved employees, i.e., the wrongdoers, as a pre-
condition for any cooperation credit. By turning corporations against their em-
ployees, the Yates Memo creates a conflict of interest, because it forces culpable
corporations to take a clear stand: namely, cough up your executives or roll the
dice.
1. Corporate Perspective
The Yates Memo exerts substantial pressure on corporations to obtain in-
criminating information about employees and to trade it with the DOJ in ex-
change for cooperation credit. This pressure may lead corporations to take an
excessively expansive view of individual involvement in wrongdoing, thereby
putting individuals needlessly at risk of criminal or civil liability. It could also
lead corporations to follow an unnecessarily coercive approach toward employ-
ees while jeopardizing their constitutional rights.
Federal courts have long rejected the use of coercive approaches toward
employees in gathering incriminating information in internal investigations. In
Garrity v. New Jersey,9o for instance, the appellants, police officers in New Jer-
sey, were questioned during the course of a state investigation concerning al-
leged traffic ticket "fixing." The officers were warned that if they refused to an-
swer questions, they would be subject to removal from office. Eventually, the
officers' answers led to their conviction in subsequent prosecutions. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that the officers' statements resulted from coercion and
88. See infra Section IV.C.
89. As corporations are held vicariously liable for their employees' wrongdoing con-
ducted within the scope of employment, under the previous enforcement policy
both employees and their employing corporations had a common interest: act in a
way that would minimize the liability exposure relating to the wrongdoing.
90. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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therefore were inadmissible in the state criminal proceedings.9' The coercion
the court rejected in the Garrity case may now be encouraged by the Yates
Memo. By denying cooperation credit to companies that disclose incomplete
information regarding individual culpability, including those that fail to learn
of it, the Yates Memo puts corporations under pressure to gather incriminating
information regarding their employees as a way of demonstrating their own co-
operation.
The impact of prosecutorial pressure on corporations regarding their ac-
tions toward employees was also discussed in the 2006 KPMG case.92 In that in-
stance, KPMG and several of its employees were investigated by the U.S. Attor-
ney's Office for the Southern District of New York in connection with a tax
evasion scheme. Based on the enforcement policy applicable at the time (the
Thompson Memo), U.S. prosecutors were asked to assess the corporation's
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including its readiness
to make witnesses available to the prosecution and its promise to support cul-
pable employees by advancing attorney fees.93 The prosecution informed
KPMG that in the absence of a legal obligation stating otherwise, the advance-
ment of attorney fees to employees could be held against KPMG. Accordingly,
KPMG decided to depart from its long-standing practice of advancing reasona-
ble attorney fees to its employees. It capped the fees and informed its employees
that no further remunerations would be advanced to anyone who failed to pro-
vide prompt, complete, and truthful information to the prosecution. The court
concluded that KPMG's decision was a direct consequence of the pressure ap-
plied by the prosecution policy, and that the government's conduct violated the
constitutional rights of KPMG employees. Consequently, the court dismissed
the indictments against several employees who had been forced to limit their
defense due to the prosecution's interference with their attorney fees and the
violation of their right against self-incrimination.9 4
A similar coercive approach and suppression of employee rights may now
be encouraged by the Yates Memo, which in practice penalizes corporations for
failing to secure incriminating information in order to demonstrate their coop-
eration with the DOJ. The Yates Memo does not explicitly require corporations
to threaten employees' employment or legal representation. Nevertheless, by
denying cooperation credit to corporations that fail to produce full information
about involved employees, the Memo has the potential to encourage corpora-
91. Id. at 500. The court held that the choice given to the employees either to forfeit
their jobs or to incriminate themselves constituted coercion, which jeopardized
their constitutional rights.
92. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
93. See Thompson Memo, supra note 25, § VI.
94. See Elkan Abramowitz & Jonathan Sack, Deferred Prosecution Agreements in De-





YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
tions to press their employees and to violate their constitutional rights by
threatening to terminate or withhold legal representation.
2. Individual Perspective
In the post-Yates Memo world, employees realize the strong incentive cor-
porations have to throw them under the bus in order to save their own interest.
The memo effectively enlists corporations as members of DOJ enforcement
teams and places them in a confrontational position with regard to their own
employees and executives. Applying the rational choice theory framework pre-
sented in Section III.B above, corporate employees would determine their ap-
proach toward the corporate investigation by assessing their expected net payoff
in each possible scenario. Their ultimate response is determined by the maximi-
zation of employees' net payoff. Accordingly, the more that employees perceive
corporate investigations as conducted on behalf of or for the benefit of the DOJ,
the greater the likelihood that employees may decline to cooperate and compli-
cate or challenge corporate investigations in order to defend themselves and
minimize their liability exposure. For instance, employees could be less moti-
vated to raise red flags or provide reports of misconduct, particularly when
sharing this information could lead to unfavorable conclusions about their own
involvement. They could also demand separate representation early on in the
internal investigation process; some may choose to fully revoke their employ-
ment, privacy, and other rights and thereby jeopardize corporate efforts to in-
vestigate matters. Ultimately, the competing interests of corporations and em-
ployees may make such investigations less effective and more expensive.
This conflict of interest may lead employees to adopt a confrontational ap-
proach even after the corporate investigation has been concluded. Employees
could challenge corporate internal investigations and demand legally privileged
material relating to the investigation, claiming that these would be required for
their defense. This phenomenon appeared in the recent "Bridgegate" case in
New Jersey, in which several individual defendants sought the interview
minutes of internal investigators, arguing that that they may contain incon-
sistent statements and other evidence that supports their defense.95
B. Chilling Cooperation
The Yates Memo changes the incentive schemes of corporations and their
employees. To benefit from cooperation credit, corporations may indeed
choose to turn in their culpable employees and thereby increase the level of de-
terrence, as originally sought by the Yates Memo. Yet while seeking to increase
corporate cooperation with the DOJ in order to hold individuals accountable,
the memo may adversely affect corporate as well as individual incentives to co-
operate with the DOJ.
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1. Corporate Perspective
The all-or-nothing approach of the Yates Memo increases the costs associ-
ated with corporate cooperation with the DOJ. The increased costs may be a re-
sult of various factors. At the outset, the Yates Memo might induce employees
to challenge and complicate corporate investigations, thereby forcing corpora-
tions to invest additional resources in gathering relevant facts from alternative
sources, like financial systems, email accounts, or call records. In that respect,
the Memo erodes some of the advantages corporations have enjoyed in com-
parison to enforcement authorities in detecting and investigating wrongdoing
by employees. Additionally, corporate internal investigations may need to in-
crease in scope and in granularity. This is directly linked to the Memo's internal
investigation goals, given the requirement to provide all relevant facts about the
individuals involved in corporate misconduct. The Yates Memo currently pro-
vides no detailed guideline as to what would be considered "all" relevant facts,
thereby leaving corporations to make choices about cooperation with a greater
degree of uncertainty. The new requirement may be understood by some cor-
porations as implying further detailed investigation, with a focus on each indi-
vidual. In the same vein, the costs of cooperation may also increase due to the
current policy's expectation that corporations will continue devoting resources
to assist prosecutors in going after individuals even after the company has set-
tled.
Moreover, the Yates Memo may reduce the readiness of corporations to
cooperate with the DOJ, as some companies might find that the cost of cooper-
ation outweighs the benefits. For instance, one strong motivation for corporate
cooperation thus far is the organization's ability to minimize the reputational
damage that might follow from long-running criminal proceedings."' As dis-
cussed above in Section I.B.2, corporate cooperation is taken into consideration
when prosecutors decide to enter into a DPA or a NPA as an alternative to
prosecution. Thus far, by cooperating with the investigation-based on stand-
ards preceding the Yates Memo-corporations have been able to limit adverse
publicity relating to enforcement actions. By entering into DPAs and NPAs, as
an alternative to a full court trial, corporations were able to avoid long periods
of recurring negative media reports, which would otherwise damage their repu-
tation. Additionally, by entering into DPAs or NPAs, corporations may some-
times be able to negotiate the text of the statement of facts that is attached to the
DPA or NPA, as well as the DOJ's or the SEC's press release, thereby reducing
reputation damages. Under the Yates Memo, this DPA- and NPA-related ad-
vantage is threatened.
As discussed above in Part II, the Yates Memo instructs U.S. Attorneys not
to provide any protection against individual liability in corporate resolutions
and to resolve individual cases following resolution of the corporate matter.
Further, under the Yates Memo, enforcement cases against individuals are ex-
pected in instances where they were not previously initiated due to individuals'
limited ability to pay. In some cases, the resolution of enforcement actions
against individuals may be reached long after the corporation has settled its
96. Minimizing the adverse impact on reputation is often discussed in the context of
reducing collateral effects due to DPAs and NPAs. See Oded, supra note 30, at 79.
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case. In such cases, corporations must face recurring adverse publicity. This was
the situation with Siemens, which resolved its FCPA investigation in 20o8 with
a record-breaking settlement of $800 million. Eight former Siemens executives
and consultants were subsequently indicted in the United States, and seventeen
related individuals were charged in Argentina. Years after Siemens had put the
case behind it and invested immense resources in boosting its compliance pro-
gram, the company's name and its FCPA scandal are still frequently featured in
media reports on enforcement actions against individuals. Most recently, Sie-
mens' case was canvassed again in the press in September 2015-seven years af-
ter its settlement-following a guilty plea of its former Chief Financial Officer
in Argentina, Andres Truppel.97
Siemens is certainly not the only case where adverse publicity resurfaces
due to follow-up enforcement actions against former corporate employees. No-
ble, for instance, dealt with publicity following the 2014 settlement reached with
its former CEO, Mark Jackson, and the head of the company's Nigeria unit,
William Ruehlen, even though Noble had settled an FCPA matter relating to
bribery of Nigerian officials with the DOJ in 2010.9' Something similar may re-
cur in the case of Alstom, which settled its FCPA matter with the DOJ in 2014.
Several Alstom employees have faced charges in the United States and the Unit-
ed Kingdom.99 Hearings in some of these proceedings are currently scheduled
for 2017. The threat of adverse publicity that continues to follow a corporation
years after reaching a settlement erodes the benefits that corporations receive
from cooperating with the DOJ. This outcome could become even more signifi-
cant given the current focus on individual accountability, thereby dampening
corporate incentives to self-report wrongdoing and to cooperate with investiga-
tions.
97. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Chief Financial Officer of Siemens
Argentina Pleads Guilty to Role in Multimillion Dollar Foreign Bribery Scheme
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-chief-financial-officer-
siemens-argentina-pleads-guilty-role-multimillion-dollar [http://perma.cc/KB7A-
WUX8].
98. For Noble's settlement, see Letter from Dennis McInerney, Chief Fraud Section,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Mary C. Spearing, Baker Botts L.L.P. (Nov. 4, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2olo/11/o4/noble-npa.pdf
[http://perma.cc/CH3H-4WTU]. For Jackson's ettlement, see Comm'n v. Jackson
et al., No. 4:12-cV-00563 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2012).
99. For Alstom's settlement with the DOJ, see United States v. Alstom S.A., No. 14-
CR-246 (D. Conn. Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/file/189331/download
[http://perma.cc/Y628-2PRV]. For individual actions relating to Alstom's matter,
see Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Alstom Pleads Guilty and Agrees To Pay
$772 Million Criminal Penalty To Resolve Foreign Bribery Charges (Dec. 22, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alstom-pleads-guilty-and-agrees-pay-772-million-
criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-bribery [http://perma.cc/C6AG-HVD4]; and
Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, Criminal Charges Against Alstom in the UK
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A recent development in DOJ enforcement policy following the release of
the Yates Memo suggests that the DOJ may have realized that the Memo pre-
sents a high risk of chilling corporate cooperation. Attempting to restore corpo-
rations' incentives to self-report and cooperate with the DOJ on FCPA matters,
on April 5, 2016, DOJ Fraud Section Chief Andrew Weissmann announced a
new one-year pilot program ("Pilot Program") to provide greater transparency
on the expectations for mitigation credit for voluntary self-disclosure, coopera-
tion, and remediation in FCPA investigations.oo Under this program, compa-
nies that voluntarily self-report FCPA-related violations, cooperate fully with
the DOJ investigation, and appropriately remediate the misconduct may receive
up to a fifty percent reduction in fines below the minimum level in the Organi-
zational Guidelines fine range. In such circumstances, the DOJ will also consid-
er declining prosecution altogether. For companies that do not voluntarily self-
report but otherwise cooperate and undertake appropriate remediation, the
DOJ will provide at most a twenty-five percent reduction in fines below the
minimum in the Organizational Guidelines range."0 ' The Pilot Program specifi-
cally endorses the Yates Memo and clarifies that, in applying the program,
companies' cooperation will be assessed by the DOJ, among other actors, based
on the completeness of the report, including disclosure of all relevant facts
about the individuals involved in any FCPA violation.
The Pilot Program has already led to several highly publicized decisions to
decline prosecution by the DOJ.o2 Those decisions cited cooperation by the
companies as a factor, including their disclosure of all known relevant facts
about the individuals involved in or responsible for the misconduct. In another
case, the DOJ entered into a NPA with BK Medical under the Pilot Program
and awarded the company a thirty percent discount off the applicable Organi-
zational Guidelines fine range.o3 The DOJ specifically mentioned that the deci-
ioo. Memorandum from Andrew Weissman, Fraud Section Chief, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
The Fraud Section's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guid-
ance (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/838386/download [http://
perma.cc/2S8C-2WQ8].
ioi. The Pilot Program also sets forth eleven threshold requirements that should be
met in order for the program to apply.
102. See Letter from Daniel Khan, Deputy Chief, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Re: Akamai Technologies, Inc. (June 6, 2016), http://www.justice.gov/criminal-
fraud/file/865411/download [http://perma.cc/MZP2-WQXR]; Letter from Daniel
Khan, Deputy Chief, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Re: Nortek, Inc. (June 3,
2016), http://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/8654o6/download [http://perma
.cc/5274-58XB]; Press Release, Johnson Controls, Inc., Johnson Controls Settles In-
vestigation of Its Marine Business in China After Self-Reporting to U.S. Govern-




103. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Analogic Subsidiary Agrees To Pay More than
$14 Million To Resolve Foreign Bribery Charges (June 21, 2016), http://www
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sion to award only a partial discount resulted from the fact that the company
"did not initially disclose certain relevant facts that it learned in the course of its
internal investigation." 10 4 While the Pilot Program has the potential to partially
cure the demotivating impact of the Yates Memo on corporate cooperation
with the DOJ, it is not expected to be the ultimate solution to the adverse effects
of the Yates Memo, given its temporary nature.
2. Individual Perspective
Employee cooperation may promote the battle against corporate financial
crime, including bribery and corruption. Employee reports of red flags and
concerns through whistleblowing systems or otherwise have sparked many in-
vestigations of corporate financial crime.0 5 Similarly, employee cooperation
with the investigation, such as sharing relevant information in interviews, pro-
motes the accuracy, efficiency, and speed of criminal and corporate investiga-
tions. Nevertheless, applying the rational choice theory framework presented in
Section III.B, corporate employees determine their level of cooperativeness uch
that their net payoff is maximized. In the post-Memo world, when employees
fear that their employer may sacrifice them in order to protect itself, it should
not come as a surprise if employees adopt a less cooperative approach. Some
might even refuse altogether to cooperate with internal investigations-e.g., to
participate in interviews or to provide information-even if by doing so they
risk disciplinary action.
Additionally, as the Yates Memo threatens to increase the legal exposure of
individual executives, those sitting in the corporate driver's seat might steer the
organization away from cooperation with the DOJ. In other circumstances,
corporate executives might decide to delay self-reporting or other cooperation
with the DOJ until the internal investigation yields a clearer picture of the in-




105. On the importance of employee reporting and the special monetary incentive pro-
vided to employees to report corporate wrongdoing, see, for example, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM'N, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 2, 16 (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/whistle
blower/reportspubs/annual-reports/owb-annual-report-2o15.pdf [http://perma
.cc/64BT-FSCD] ("In Fiscal Year 2015, we received nearly 4,000 whistleblower tips,
a 30% increase over the number of tips received in Fiscal Year 2012, the first year
for which we have full-year data. Many of the tips have led staff in the SEC's Divi-
sion of Enforcement ... to open an investigation or are being considered in con-
nection with an existing investigation.... Of the award recipients who were cur-
rent or former employees, approximately 8o% raised their concerns internally to
their supervisors or compliance personnel, or understood that their supervisor or
relevant compliance personnel knew of the violations, before reporting their in-
formation of wrongdoing to the Commission.").
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C. The Yates Memo: Efficiency Outcome
Having described the possible impacts of the Yates Memo on the incentives
of individuals and corporations, this Section evaluates the ultimate outcome of
the Memo from the point of view of welfare maximization. Its evaluation focus-
es on the extent to which the policy promulgated by the Memo satisfies the
combined goal of anti-bribery enforcement policy: namely, minimizing the cost
of bribery and its prevention. The basis for this analysis is the rational choice
theory framework presented in Section III.B above, under which corporations
and individuals consider their course of action-whether to engage in bribery,
whether to self-report, or whether to cooperate with the investigation-by as-
sessing their expected net payoff in each possible scenario. Actors will ultimately
choose the course of action that maximizes their net payoff. Given this back-
drop, the analysis below reveals that the Memo threatens to increase the overall
cost of anti-bribery enforcement and eventually also the overall social cost of
bribery.
1. Cost of Anti-Bribery Enforcement
As discussed above in Section IV.B.1, by enhancing the personal liability
risk of corporate executives and increasing the net cost of cooperation, the Yates
Memo may dampen corporations' motivation to cooperate with the DOJ's in-
vestigation. In so doing, the Memo erodes many of the advantages of the coop-
erative enforcement model that preceded its promulgation. As discussed above
in Section III.A, the new policy prevents U.S. prosecutors from awarding partial
credit even for actions that are highly valuable from an enforcement perspec-
tive.
Consider, for instance, the case of Ralph Lauren.o' In 2013, the corporation
entered into dual NPAs with the DOJ and the SEC in relation to a bribery pay-
ment by its Argentinian subsidiary to government officials. Both U.S. authori-
ties decided not to charge the company in response to its cooperation with the
investigation. In this case, Ralph Lauren provided the prosecution with com-
plete information, including details about the involvement of employees in the
bribery scheme. But according to the authorities' press releases, the company
also cooperated in various other valuable ways. The firm (i) voluntarily self-
reported the bribery on its own initiative within two weeks of its discovery; (ii)
voluntarily and expeditiously produced documents from the internal investiga-
tion, including summaries of interviews conducted by the corporate investiga-
tor overseas; (iii) provided an English language translation of documents to the
authorities; (iv) made overseas witnesses available for interviews with the au-
1o6. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Ralph Lauren Corporation Resolves For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees To Pay $882,000 Monetary
Penalty (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ralph-lauren-corporation-
resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-agrees-pay [http://perma
.cc/WKF7-SGCE]; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Announces Non-
Prosecution Agreement with Ralph Lauren Corporation Involving FCPA Miscon-
duct (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease
/1365171514780 [http://perma.cc/YBR5-D7BN].
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thorities, including by bringing witnesses to the United States; (v) implemented
significant remedial measures, including a comprehensive new compliance pro-
gram throughout its operations; (vi) terminated employment and business ar-
rangements with all individuals involved in the wrongdoing; (vii) strengthened
its internal controls and its procedures for third-party due diligence; (viii) insti-
tuted a whistleblower hotline; (ix) hired a designated corporate compliance at-
torney; and, eventually, (x) ceased its entire operation in Argentina. Both the
DOJ and SEC praised the level of Ralph Lauren's cooperation.
Ralph Lauren's cooperative measures were undoubtedly socially valuable,
even in the absence of a complete report regarding the involvement of employ-
ees. These actions promoted the combined goal of anti-bribery enforcement,
which is to reduce the social cost of bribery and its prevention.o7 But consider:
what would happen today if Ralph Lauren had undertaken all these actions
short of providing all relevant facts about the individuals involved in corporate
misconduct? Under the Yates Memo's "all-or-nothing" approach, the DOJ
would have to disregard all of Ralph Lauren's cooperative actions, and it would
have to refuse to award any cooperation credit in the form of a NPA, a DPA, or
mitigated sentencing. Given these consequences, Ralph Lauren might have pre-
ferred not to cooperate with the investigation altogether, including by not dis-
closing the violation in the first place."as Ralph Lauren, or other companies in
similar situations, would have little incentive to detect bribery and invest re-
sources in investigating it. Instead, corporations in these situations could be
motivated to invest in covering their tracks, thereby reducing the likelihood of
U.S. authorities ever discovering the wrongdoing.
The Yates Memo, therefore, may actually increase the public costs of anti-
bribery enforcement. In order to maintain the same level of deterrence, U.S. au-
thorities would be required to compensate for the lack of corporate cooperation
by investing further resources in detecting, investigating, and prosecuting cul-
pable corporations and employees.o9
Moreover, the Yates Memo threatens to increase anti-bribery enforcement
in various other previously mentioned ways. As indicated above in Section
IV.B.2, it may lead corporate executives to steer the company away from coop-
eration or to otherwise delay self-reporting and cooperation until the internal
investigation yields a clearer picture regarding involvement and the individuals
who may have been responsible. Additionally, as described above in Section
IV.A.2, the conflict of interest between corporations and employees fueled by
the Yates Memo could induce employees to challenge and complicate corporate
investigations, and thereby make these investigations less effective and more
expensive. Furthermore, as discussed above in Sections III.B and IV.B, under
the Yates Memo, enforcement cases against individuals are expected in cases
where they were not initiated previously due to individuals' limited ability to
107. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note lo6 ("Ralph Lauren Corpora-
tion's cooperation saved the agency substantial time and resources ordinarily con-
sumed in investigations of comparable conduct.").
108. See supra Section IV.B.i.
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pay. Such enforcement actions have little value from a social welfare point of
view, as they do not increase the deterrence effect." Although generally a larger
fine has greater deterrent potential than a smaller one, once the fine outweighs
the total wealth of the person, further increases have little, if any, deterrent ef-
fect. Similarly, as described above in Section IV.A.i, the pressure exerted by the
Yates Memo on corporations may lead them to take an excessively expansive
view of individual involvement in wrongdoing, thereby needlessly expanding
their investigations and putting individuals at risk of criminal or civil liability.
2. Cost of Bribery
While seeking to deter bribery, thereby reducing the social costs involved in
corrupt practices, the Yates Memo may achieve the opposite result. Given the
Memo's impact on individual and corporate incentives, it may dilute the deter-
rence generated by U.S. anti-bribery enforcement policy and under certain cir-
cumstances lead to more-rather than less-bribery and corruption. The Yates
Memo propels U.S. enforcement policy closer to a purely strict liability system
under which corporations are insufficiently incentivized to self-report and co-
operate with investigative authorities."' Such a regime does not reap the ad-
vantages of a cooperative enforcement system but rather increases public
spending on a cat-and-mouse enforcement game between authorities and cor-
porations."' As such, the Memo may lead to alienation, resistance, and antago-
nism on the part of corporations, which ultimately undermines their willing-
ness to play a meaningful role in combating bribery and corruption."3 As a
result, U.S. enforcement authorities may lose an important enforcement part-
ner and thus dilute-rather than reinforce-the deterrent effect of the en-
forcement policy.
Furthermore, given the potential reduction of corporate cooperation with
the DOJ, the Memo may lead to a decrease in the number of agreed-upon reso-
lutions. Under such circumstances, detected bribery may eventually go unpun-
ished if corporate non-cooperation prevents the DOJ from obtaining the re-
quired evidence to meet the standard of proof required in criminal and civil
proceedings. This shortage of effective enforcement is most likely when its exe-
cution is most needed: namely, in bribery cases involving large multinational
corporations where detection is most challenging, and those in which corporate
executives are involved in wrongdoing.
Lastly, the increased cost of anti-bribery enforcement discussed above in
Section IV.C.i may also erode deterrence. Given the increased costs that would
have to be devoted to each FCPA investigation, the DOJ's limited resources may
need to be allocated to a smaller number of matters, leaving others untended.
no. See ODED, supra note 20, at 31; Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use
of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1232 (1985); Steven
Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 45 (1986).
In. See supra Section III.E.
112. See ODED, supra note 20, at 36.
113. Id. at 38.
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CONCLUSION
The Yates Memo formalizes the focus of U.S. enforcement authorities on
individual accountability and thereby seeks to deter corporate wrongdoing. It
does so by declining cooperation credit unless organizations provide the DOJ
with all relevant facts about individual misconduct or about who is responsible
for the misconduct in question, regardless of their position, status, or seniority.
In this manner, the Memo essentially enlists corporations as members of en-
forcement investigation teams and places them in a confrontational position
toward their own employees and executives. Indeed, one could argue that the
DOJ should elevate the importance of individual prosecutions and extend its
efforts beyond corporate settlements. Nevertheless, the question remains
whether awarding cooperation credit on the condition that corporations turn in
their culpable employees promotes the U.S. anti-bribery enforcement goal:
namely, minimizing the costs relating to bribery and its prevention.
This Article has presented a law and economics perspective of the social de-
sirability of the Yates Memo from a welfare maximization perspective. The
analysis is based on the proposition that the Memo is socially desirable if the
resulting social benefits outweigh its negative ramifications. Against this back-
drop, however, the Article reveals two basic pitfalls in the Yates Memo. First,
the Memo generates a conflict of interest between employees and corporations,
thereby challenging corporate ability and motivation to effectively control,
monitor, and investigate employees. Second, the Memo may produce a chilling
effect on corporate cooperation with the DOJ's anti-bribery enforcement. By
setting a demanding threshold for cooperation credit, the Memo may diminish
the appeal of cooperating altogether. These dangers may lead the Yates Memo
to unnecessarily complicate U.S. anti-bribery enforcement while weakening its
deterrent effect. Although the full impact of the Memo remains to be seen, the
analysis in this Article casts serious doubts on the social desirability of the policy
shift announced by the Yates Memo and calls for its prompt reconsideration.
Holding individual actors accountable for wrongdoing within the scope of
their employment is undoubtedly an important measure that may have a real
impact on corporate culture, possibly more than corporate liability alone may
achieve. Corporations may certainly play an important role in promoting this
goal. However, the Yates Memo's all-or-nothing approach may not necessarily
bring us there. Future research may identify preferred enforcement policy
mechanisms that might more efficiently encourage corporations to actively
promote individual accountability. Such mechanisms may, for instance, assign
a greater role to corporations in executing actions against employees whose
fraudulent behavior caused losses to the company. The DOJ's current enforce-
ment policy may deter corporations from initiating civil proceedings against
fraudulent employees because such actions may publicly reveal their own cul-
pability and lead to the initiation of a criminal investigation. An enforcement
policy that recognizes and rewards corporate efforts to hold individual employ-
ees accountable for wrongdoing, such as through preferred treatment or im-
munity, may utilize corporations' embedded advantages in controlling their
employees while truly reinforcing individual accountability and corporate co-
operation.
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